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LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 2018. Pp. xii + 221. $41.00 (Cloth). 
David Schraub1 
What makes a judicial decision legitimate? Common answers 
include fidelity to legal texts and precedent, coherence to natural or 
intersubjectively agreed upon norms, or endorsement from 
democratically accountable actors. But while these criteria each 
have strong theoretical appeal, their practical usefulness as a means 
of validating any contested judicial decision is often limited. In 
cases of legal indeterminacy or the proverbial “hard cases,” many 
different outcomes can at least claim to fulfill these requirements. A 
decision which genuinely fulfills legitimacy criteria and one which 
is merely going through the motions often will be observationally 
equivalent. 
As a means of practically establishing legal legitimacy in a way 
verifiable to external observers, pain is an underappreciated but 
important element of judicial practice. Judges routinely brag of 
rendering decisions which are painful to them—upholding 
“uncommonly silly laws,” protecting “speech that we hate,” 
reluctantly permitting terrible injustices to persist because the law 
“ties our hands.” Far from being relegated to the embarrassed 
fringes, such cases play a central role in establishing judges as 
legitimate actors bound by law, and in many ways represent the 
demarcation line between good and bad judges—a good judge is 
one who does not flinch even in the face of great pain. Yet it should 
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be clear that there is great risk in tying the validation of judges to 
the infliction and receipt of pain. To the extent judges are socialized 
into associating pain with legitimacy, the legal system that emerges 
will likely be one which needlessly and gratuitously inflicts pain. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Judge Richard Kopf of the District of Nebraska 
levied a powerful warning for aspiring federal judges. He asked 
them to ask themselves: “Am I a willing judicial executioner, a 
person who consciously does great harm to other human beings 
by faithfully executing the extraordinarily harsh national criminal 
laws?” The question, Judge Kopf continued, gets at a painful 
truth: “When sentencing people, federal trial judges literally and 
consciously destroy lives and most do so on a daily basis.” “Those 
who covet a federal trial judgeship,” he advised, “should think 
hard about this truth before pursuing the job.”2 
It’s good advice. This reality of judging—the necessity of 
inflicting pain as a daily feature of the job—is one all judicial 
candidates should reflect upon. On the other hand, we probably 
don’t want judges who, after pondering whether they can serve as 
a “willing judicial executioner,” answer with a hearty and cheerful 
affirmative. Perhaps the moral of the story is that the best judges 
are perpetually miserable. 
Richard Fallon’s book Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme 
Court does not spend much time considering the emotional well-
being of judges—their happiness or sadness. Its focus is, as the 
name implies, on questions of legitimacy in judicial decision-
making. “By what moral right” does the United States Supreme 
Court “establish controversial rules of law . . . and then enforce its 
dictates coercively? Or, perhaps better, How [sic] would the 
Supreme Court of the United States need to decide the cases 
before it—both procedurally and substantively—in order to 
justify imposing its will on those who reasonably disagree with its 
conclusions . . . ?” (p. 7). 
 
 2. Richard Kopf, Want Ad: A Judicial Executioner to Serve for a Lifetime, 
HERCULES & THE UMPIRE (Sept. 30, 2013), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/09/30 
/want-ad-a-judicial-executioner-to-serve-for-a-lifetime/. Judge Kopf’s words also evoke 
Robert Cover’s bracing declaration that “judges deal pain and death.” Robert Cover, 
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609 (1986). 
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Yet the paradox of the miserable judge has more relevance 
to the question of legal legitimacy than might be apparent at first 
glance. It is not just that judges inflict pain as part of their daily 
job. It is more fundamental than that: judges inflict pain and 
thereby validate and legitimize their job. A judge who is charged 
to be simply a tyrant in a robe, maximizing her own policy 
preferences while dressing it all up in legalese, will instinctively 
rejoin by citing all the cases where she would have preferred to 
rule in a different way, was agonized by what the law compelled 
her to do, but nonetheless acted in accordance with it. In a very 
real sense, it is these “painful” decisions—the ones judges hate, 
the ones where they palpably and vocally wince and squirm, the 
ones which cause or sanction obvious harm and injury that goes 
beyond what seems fair or justifiable as a matter of pure ethics— 
that are the most important to establishing judges as constrained 
by law and therefore legitimate. In this way, the question of 
legitimation becomes inextricably bound up with questions of 
pain—the judge who inflicts pain and who reflexively feels pain in 
return. 
Part I offers an introduction by assessing Fallon’s approach 
to the judicial legitimation project as a means of distinguishing 
truly “legal” decisions from mere judicial caprice. While 
theoretically rigorous, it suffers because many of the features 
which putatively distinguish licit versus lawless judging are 
difficult if not impossible to observe and so cannot actually serve 
to legitimate any particular judicial decision in a universe where 
essentially all contested judicial decisions are at least plausibly 
legalistic. 
Part II suggests that pain appears to offer a viable means of 
observationally confirming that a judicial decision genuinely 
stems from legalistic commitments—the decision that the judge is 
pained to hand down, generally because it causes unjust pain to 
others, is presumptively legitimate insofar as the judge has no 
other reason to make such a ruling but because he or she is legally 
compelled to do so. Of course, conceptually the only true 
connection between pain and legitimate judicial decision-making 
is one of compatibility: a decision can be painful and still 
legitimate. Yet—precisely because it appears to offer the elusive 
guarantee of judicial legitimacy—pain can easily become viewed 
as a heuristic for or even constitutive of legitimate judging. Judges 
come to sadomasochistically crave pain and the legitimacy it 
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provides, seeking out pain and reveling in the painful outcomes 
even when they are not demanded by the law. 
Part III concludes by exploring the degree to which the 
judiciary today can be described as engaging in sadomasochistic 
judging. After the 2016 election, there were some predictions that 
the Supreme Court would serve as a check against extreme abuses 
by the Trump administration—expectations premised on the 
(likely true) assumption that even most conservative judges were 
not “Trumpist” in their personal beliefs. Instead, over the course 
of the Trump administration the Supreme Court in particular has 
not just handed repeated victories to the administration, it has 
taken extraordinary steps—often in the cases (particularly 
surrounding immigration) in which the Trump administration’s 
cruelties are at their apex—to intervene on the administration’s 
behalf in manners that circumvent the ordinary appellate review 
process. That the Court is wielding not just its purely legal analytic 
power but also its discretionary power (e.g., over when to grant 
certiorari, stays, injunctions, and so on) in these cases—and seems 
if anything more inclined to do so in cases where the judges might 
be thought to be most squeamish about the tangible outcomes of 
the decision—cries out for explanation. While it is possible that it 
simply reflects a basic policy affinity between the justices and the 
administration on these issues, it may actually stem from the 
opposite instinct: the sense that a good judge, a legitimate judge, 
is one who does not shy away from his or her duty in the face of 
pain; a suspicion that (lower court) judges who arrest pain are 
shirking this duty; and the conclusion that the rule of law demands 
if anything greater attention and scrutiny to those cases and 
rulings where courts are avoiding pain—and thereby, potentially, 
avoiding their judicial duty. 
I. LEGAL LEGITIMACY VERSUS JUDICIAL CAPRICE 
Fallon introduces his book by recalling a remark from Justice 
Brennan that “the most important number in the Supreme Court 
is five.” Why? Because “[w]ith five votes, you can do anything” 
(p. x).3 Justice Brennan was no doubt speaking somewhat tongue 
in cheek. Nonetheless, he was evoking one of the recurrent fears 
 
 3. Later on, Fallon quotes Charles Evans Hughes making a similar point: “the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is” (p. 105). 
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surrounding the exercise of judicial power—that it is naught but 
the caprice of a judicial majority, that given a panel majority 
judges are free to simply do anything they like.4 Judicial legitimacy 
is meant as a conceptual check against this vision of terrifying 
judicial freedom-as-tyranny.5 
One potential mechanism for constraining judges—ensuring 
that they decide based on law, and not their own subjective 
whim—is attempting to formulate a constitutional theory that 
minimizes if not eliminates indeterminacy. If there is only one 
correct outcome to any potential case or controversy, and that 
outcome is fairly discernable by a suitably well-trained legal 
observer, then a judge who deviates from the one true path can 
be immediately recognized as a rogue or usurper. Originalism 
often holds itself out as providing such legal determinacy,6 though 
Fallon is deeply skeptical that it succeeds in its aspiration (pp. 
137–142). 
But Fallon makes the more expansive argument that “the 
very ambition of developing a perfectly determinate 
constitutional theory should strike us as misguided—indeed, as 
terrifyingly so” (p. 141). A perfectly determinate judicial theory 
always runs the risk of compelling “practically and morally 
 
 4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293 (1992) (“Constitutional theory in the last several 
decades has been obsessed with the question of how to constrain judges’ exercise of 
will, . . . try[ing] to refute accusations that judges are simply expressing their own subjective 
preferences when they interpret the Constitution.”). 
 5. The capacity to command while being absolutely free from the commands of 
others is the marker of sovereignty under an early modern tradition dating from Jean 
Bodin and continuing through Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—an 
understanding which has generated considerable worry that their theories are simply 
apologies for tyranny. Under this view, judicial supremacy—where judges get the 
effectively the “last word” on interpretations of law, immune from reproach by the 
democratic branches—might be thought to strip sovereignty from the people and place it 
in the hands of unelected judges. But as I have argued elsewhere, a more careful reading 
of the Bodin/Hobbes/Rousseau tradition would adhere to the distinction between 
sovereignty and government, locating the former not in any of the branches of government 
but in the residual—and unlimited—constitution-making authority that remains in the 
hands of the people. See David Schraub, Finding the “Sovereign” in “Sovereign Immunity”: 
Lessons from Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau, 29 CRIT. REV. 388 (2017). 
 6. Fallon cites KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 61–62 (1999); Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); and Stephen E. Sachs, 
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015). Fallon 
criticizes the latter, in particular, in detail (p. 204 n.7). 
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disastrous outcomes,” and few are willing to actually endorse 
these consequences simply because theory demands it (p. 141). 
This is the force of Michael McConnell’s famous concession that 
“if any particular [constitutional] theory does not produce the 
conclusion that Brown [v. Board of Education] was correctly 
decided, the theory is seriously discredited” (p. 145).7 Just as 
Anatole France suggested that “to die for an idea is to place a 
pretty high price on conjecture,” in law, Fallon observes, “the 
stakes are too high” to tie oneself to “an advance, let-the-chips-
fall-where-they-may commitment” to a determinate 
constitutional theory (p. 141). 
Seeking to avoid both the dangers of utterly unconstrained, 
whim-based judging as well as rigid, algorithmic determinacy, 
Fallon lands upon an application of John Rawls’ famous concept 
of the “reflective equilibrium.”8 Rawls promoted the reflective 
equilibrium as a mechanism for developing and fine-tuning 
principles of political justice. In short, Rawls observes that 
humans have convictions regarding both broad principles and 
specific cases of justice. Ideally, these convictions are in 
harmony—that is, application of the general principles yields the 
outcomes we intuitively understand to be “just” in essential cases. 
In practice, there will likely be discrepancies: circumstances where 
application of the principles does not lead to the results we would 
have expected based on our pre-investigative notions of justice. 
In those circumstances, we have two choices: we can revise our 
case-specific judgments to align with the theory, or we can revise 
the theory so that it generates the desired results.9 
Either move is, or can be, appropriate. Certainly, in many 
cases where application of a principle requires an outcome that 
the deliberator did not as an initial matter endorse, the proper 
moral decision is nonetheless to adhere to the principle. After all, 
that’s what principles are for. A deliberator who only adhered to 
their stated moral principles in cases where they agreed with the 
outcome could hardly be said to be bound by principles in the first 
place. Yet, it is equally clear that in some cases, the fact that the 
principle demands an especially appalling or unacceptable 
 
 7. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 952 (1995). 
 8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 48–51 (1971). 
 9. Id. at 20. 
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outcome is taken to indict the validity of the principle itself. For 
how do we assess which principles deserve our allegiance but by 
checking to see if they successfully generate desirable (or at least 
tolerable) states of the world? It hardly can be the case that we 
are duty-bound to follow a “principle” which, as applied to a 
specific social fact pattern, turned out to demand “genocide,” 
“slavery,” or “extinction-level environmental damage,” even if we 
had all nominally agreed to the principle in advance. 
As in justice, so too in law—or so Fallon argues. Contrary to 
the belief of some, judges should not ascend to the bench 
committed to a set of legal principles which they then must cling 
to come hell or high water (pp. 126–127). While judges should 
have at least “provisional” commitment to a particular 
interpretive theory, and should be willing to revise case-specific 
judgments to cohere to that theory, in certain cases judges should 
be willing to make adjustments on the side of principle, not just 
the side of outcomes. Like in deliberations about justice, a 
mismatch between one’s overarching interpretive principles and 
one’s intuitions regarding legal outcomes might normally suggest 
revising one’s stance on the outcome, but in the right 
circumstances truly intolerable outcomes might call into question 
the robustness of the principle. Once we reject the simplistic 
notion, whereby we are powerless subjects of the founding 
generation, we must embrace “the role and responsibility . . . in 
maintaining and possibly reshaping the constitutional order” (p. 
87). The notion of being fully bound and constrained interferes 
with our practical—and unavoidable—role in creating 
constitutional meaning. 
So, if judges cannot be strictly bound to rigid and previously-
agreed to interpretive theories, what makes judicial decisions 
legitimate? How must the judiciary “decide the cases that come 
before it—both procedurally and substantively—in order to 
justify imposing its will on those who reasonably disagree with its 
conclusions?” (p. 7). Fallon offers three basic “considerations” 
that judges must adhere to in order to maintain legitimacy in cases 
of sharp contestation: 
1)  They “must stay within the bounds of law,” or at least within 
the realm of reasonable judgment about what the bounds of 
the law permit; 
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2)  They must exhibit reasonable practical and moral judgment; 
and 
3)  They must support decisions via arguments made in “good 
faith” (p. 11). 
These are indeed good guidelines for judges to follow. And it 
seems clear that considerations such as these generate at least 
some internal motivation that in practice constrains judicial 
behavior. Even judges who disavow explicit or rigidly mechanistic 
constitutional theorizing almost certainly “deny the 
appropriateness of deciding on whim” (p. 132). As Fallon 
observes, judges not only “feel bound by, and seek to obey and 
enforce, legal rules” but also “seek to hold each other to norms of 
proper conduct” vis-à-vis legal requirements (p. 93). Indeed, to 
some extent the judicial power depends for its very authority on 
the understanding that judges are limited as interpreters of duly 
enacted law. If there were no publicly accepted notion of legal and 
constitutional constraints that serve to effectively bind judges, the 
result would not be “constitutionally unconstrained Justices” but 
rather the absence of any figures recognized as judges at all (pp. 
106–107). 
The problem, of course, is that these norm-bound limits on 
judicial conduct are extremely fuzzy, as Fallon admits and indeed, 
in some ways, depends upon (for example, in insisting that we 
“not take too exacting or unforgiving a stance” in evaluating 
whether judges have failed to stay within the bounds of the law or 
exhibited reasonable practical and moral judgment) (p. 11). The 
cases that illustrate a failure to abide by these considerations—
Fallon offers the example of an interlocutor who admits that an 
argument they made before that they now contradict was made 
“only for rhetorical purposes, without really believing it” (p. 12, 
see also p. 130)—are extreme, and unlikely to manifest in reality. 
Few of the controversial Supreme Court cases that generate 
anxiety about legitimacy will involve judicial conduct that 
decisively evinces an utter failure to stay within the bounds of law, 
catastrophic collapses of moral or practical judgment, or 
tauntingly brazen refusals to offer “good faith” arguments for a 
given legal position.10 
 
 10. Indeed, a large part of the problem is that even judicial opinions which seemingly 
fail Fallon’s test often will not read as so failing—the judge who makes an argument in bad 
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This fuzziness generates a crisis at the core of the judicial 
legitimation project. Leslie Moran describes the dilemma well: 
When the language and the rules of the law are shown to be 
incapable of either providing clear guidelines or imposing strict 
limits upon action, the law begins to appear as a practice that is 
not so much a thing in opposition to violence but as a practice 
that has many characteristics that have been associated with 
violence. Thus law appears now as an arbitrary practice of 
domination rather than a practice controlled by language, rule 
and reason. Without the guidance arising from an authentic 
source of law, decision making might get out of hand. Without 
rule or reason judicial practice appears to be a practice without 
a referee or a controller. Legal practice no longer appears to be 
benign and impartial controlled by the rigorous demands of 
language, rule or reason but appears to be a practice of co-
coercion more closely associated with the whim of those who 
have access to it.11 
Judicial supremacy, coupled with the potential limitless 
power implied by the importance of “counting to five,” renders 
judges deeply anxious about their seemingly unbounded and 
unending freedom—a freedom that can easily tilt into tyranny. 
This anxiety manifests as a need for legitimacy that is both 
internally and externally imposed: internally, because judges 
genuinely are uncomfortable with the prospect that they, 
personally, should possess so much power given their relative lack 
of democratic accountability, and externally, because in order for 
the judicial power to have practical effect in a system where they 
lack both power of the sword or the purse12 their decision-making 
needs to be viewed as legitimate. 
The crux of the dilemma is this: In order to be legitimated, 
judicial action must be understood to derive from authoritative 
legal sources that are not reducible to the simple whim and caprice 
of the presiding judge or panel majority. Otherwise it is scarcely 
distinguishable from capricious violence—impotent if it fails, 
tyrannical if it succeeds. Yet distinguishing between those 
 
faith will nonetheless, if she is halfway competent, be able to dress it up in language that 
at least plausibly respects the standards of good faith and reasonable judgment. This goes 
to the broader point regarding the need for something which observationally distinguishes 
“good” and “bad” judicial practices. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. Leslie J. Moran, Violence and the Law: The Case of Sado-Masochism, 4 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 225, 234 (1995). 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R Pole ed., 2005). 
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decisions which are authentically generated from law and those 
which are not is by no means straightforward. And so, Fallon asks, 
“In a world in which no one has perfect factual knowledge and in 
which we must anticipate and respect legal and moral 
disagreement, how do we mark the boundaries of legitimate 
judicial decision making?” (p. 125). 
II. SADOMASOCHISTIC JUDGING 
A. PAIN AS A SIGNAL OF LEGITIMATE JUDGING 
In order to escape this dilemma, judges need ways to credibly 
signal that they are acting within the bounds of law. And in order 
to be effective, these signals must in some way serve to render 
observationally distinct those decisions which are genuinely 
generated from and are bounded by legal constraints from actions 
by judges that manage to follow proper legal forms even as they 
are actually motivated by or in pursuit of extra-legalistic interests. 
But now we run into another serious problem: there are very 
few markers which facially distinguish these two sorts of cases. 
When Fallon dismisses the arrogant judge who simply declares 
“[m]y methodology is just to follow the law,” as either “being 
mistaken, misleading, or possibly [speaking] in bad faith” (p. 133), 
he is alluding to this point—the non-obviousness of what decisions 
are and are not examples of “just following the law.” Even to 
educated observers steeped in the legal tradition, the lawful and 
lawless ruling may look remarkably alike. 
In 1950, Karl Llewellyn observed that virtually any well-
respected canon of statutory construction has an equally 
venerable counter-canon pointing in the precise opposite 
direction. Each of these—canon and counter-canon, “thrust and 
parry”—carries a perfectly sound legal pedigree and plausible 
basis in legal theory.13 These contradictory canons probably do 
not allow judges to do anything they desire. But they do vastly 
expand the number of legal readings which can plausibly call 
themselves correct “as a matter of law.”14 A judge who seeks to 
drape his or her whim in plausible legal garb will not lack for 
 
 13. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). 
 14. Id. at 395 (“One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there 
is no single right and accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases.”). 
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choices. Many years later, Philip Bobbitt discussed the various 
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation (e.g., textual, 
historical, doctrinal, prudential), which for any given legal 
question can each point to different plausible legal answers (p. 
135).15 Here too, there are opportunities for “legal” and “whim-
based” judging to observationally converge—in few cases will no 
legal modality be available to a judge looking to justify a 
contentious ruling or holding. And the effect of precedent and 
prior practice, far from “liquidating” or otherwise settling 
constitutional meaning, can have the practical effect of further 
fragmenting it: each decision and each instance of practice 
proliferates the number of facially legitimate threads offering 
“eligible foundations for modern Court decisions” (p. 80). 
Even in circumstances where we now know that anything 
resembling “law” took a subordinate stance to authoritarian 
power—such as judicial decisions involving Black litigants in the 
Jim Crow South—the rancid, racist lawlessness we associate with 
that state of affairs was not typically marked on the body of the 
text. Cases involving Black litigants that came before southern 
courts in fact look exceedingly normal in their manner of 
presenting evidence, citing precedents, and working through legal 
reasoning. Consider the Scottsboro cases. These are generally 
portrayed as an attempted “legalized lynching” by the Alabama 
judiciary,16 checked only by two successive Supreme Court 
interventions in Powell v. Alabama17 and Norris v. Alabama.18 In 
context, that assessment is perfectly accurate. But the opinions of 
the Alabama Supreme Court, affirming the convictions 
nonetheless are styled in perfectly ordinary, prosaic legal prose.19 
They make arguments, cite relevant precedents, engage with the 
dissenting opinion filed by Chief Justice John C. Anderson,20 and 
 
 15. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). 
 16. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing 
Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1458 (2016). 
 17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing convictions based on denial of counsel). 
 18. 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (reversing convictions based on systemic exclusion of Blacks 
from the juror selection process). 
 19. See, e.g., Norris v. State, 156 So. 556 (Ala. 1934); Patterson v. State, 141 So. 195 
(Ala. 1932); Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala. 1932); Weems v. State, 141 So. 215 (Ala. 
1932). 
 20. Indeed, the fact that there was a dissenting opinion at all might be thought to 
further falsify the notion that a Black criminal defendant in a rape case would 
automatically lose his appeal in the Alabama judiciary without any substantive review.  
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otherwise look remarkably similar to criminal law decisions issued 
by state appellate courts today. 
There is, however, one type of decision which—on face at 
least—can plausibly claim to result only from a judge “following 
the law” rather than his or her own personal moral or policy 
preferences. In certain cases, judges (credibly) express anguish or 
distress at what they are “forced” to do by law. These are 
“painful” judgments; they by stipulation entail a judge 
announcing a ruling whose results they do not wish to impose 
upon the world, carrying consequences which they are 
uncomfortable with or even abhor. But precisely they are so 
painful, they seemingly cannot be motivated by anything but 
adherence to the law. Hence, perhaps paradoxically, these painful 
decisions carry the strongest claim to legal legitimacy and do the 
most work in establishing that judges are actually and not just 
nominally constrained by law. Put differently: the legitimacy 
problem posed by Justice Brennan’s “five votes” remark assumes 
that the alternative to legitimate judicial practice is one where 
judges just do whatever makes them happy. So what better proof 
that they’re not doing that than decisions where they do things 
that bring them pain? 
Judges love bragging about painful cases as visible 
demonstrations of their fealty to rule of law commitments. Why 
else would a judge issue such a ruling unless they were bound to 
do it? The pain offers up a form of martyrdom, for, as Robert 
Cover writes, “the miracle of the suffering of the martyrs is their 
insistence on the law to which they are committed, even in the 
face of world-destroying pain.”21 And if nothing else, we respect 
the martyrs, even when we may not endorse the cause upon which 
they offer their sacrifice. Consider the dissent in Griswold v. 
 
Moreover, Chief Justice Anderson’s dissent was actually quite vigorous. He attacked 
the “pro forma” representation the defendants received, Powell, 141 So. at 214 (Anderson, 
C.J., dissenting), noted that the universally-imposed death sentence on every defendant 
suggested that the defendants cases were not assessed individually or with any reflective 
appraisal of distinguishing features between the various defendants (on account of age, 
leadership, or other factors), id. at 215, and insisted that the trial should have been delayed 
until “after some months of cooling time have elapsed” to ensure that a fair decision could 
be reached, id. In a particularly striking passage, given the context of the times, Anderson 
even went out of his way to note that each defendant was “a human being” and therefore 
was entitled to “a fair and impartial trial” as well as a penalty (if found guilty) that “an 
impartial jury, unawed by outside pressure, may under the law inflict upon him.” Id. 
 21. Cover, supra note 2, at 1604. 
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Connecticut, where Justice Stewart voted to affirm the 
constitutionality of what he called an “uncommonly silly law” 
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to married couples.22 This 
dissent is famous and generally well-respected with the legal 
profession—somewhat remarkably, given the ferocity with which 
Griswold itself is today defended against attempts to overturn or 
delegitimize it. 
Free speech is another arena where judges validate their 
decisions based on the pain that they cause—to themselves and to 
others. In Texas v. Johnson, striking down bans on flag 
desecration, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]he hard fact is that 
sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them 
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the 
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.”23 Flag burning is 
protected by the Constitution, “however painful this judgment is 
to announce.”24 In another First Amendment case, upholding the 
right of a private club to have sex-discriminatory admissions rules, 
Judge Richard Arnold wrote that “if, in the phrase of Justice 
Holmes, the First Amendment protects ‘the thought that we hate,’ 
it must also, on occasion, protect the association of which we 
disapprove.”25 Even though this decision was ultimately reversed 
by the Supreme Court,26 it was nonetheless flagged by Richard 
Garnett (one of Judge Arnold’s former clerks) as an example of 
“constitutional courage” for which he “deserves praise.”27 Indeed, 
Professor Garnett devoted the entirety of a later tribute article to 
a defense of Judge Arnold’s Jaycees opinion.28 
Appeals to the legitimating power of pain appear very early 
in the history of the American judiciary, and I suspect this is no 
accident. When the judiciary’s powers vis-à-vis the other branches 
remained unestablished and relatively untested, it was especially 
important to confirm that judicial action was not simply a cloaked 
 
 22. 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 23. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. at 421. 
 25. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 26. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 27. Richard W. Garnett, Tribute to the Honorable Richard Sheppard Arnold for His 
Service as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 185, 212 (1999). 
 28. Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S. Arnold and the 
Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587 (2005). 
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attempt by the justices to assert raw political power.29 In 
Hayburn’s Case, decided over ten years before Marbury v. 
Madison, the Supreme Court intimated at least the possibility of 
reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws, but did so couched 
in language of how wrenching such an act would be. The Court 
extensively quoted a letter written jointly by Justice Iredell and 
North Carolina Federal District Court Judge John Sitgreaves, 
where they stated that “we never can find ourselves in a more 
painful situation than to be obliged to object to the execution of 
any [legislative act], more especially to the execution of one 
founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which 
the act in question undoubtedly is.”30 
The Marshall court picked up this language of pain, using it 
to validate expansions of judicial power even as it supposedly 
demonstrated the continued allegiance of the judiciary to the law 
and Constitution. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court 
reaffirmed its prerogative to strike down unconstitutional federal 
acts, observing that “[s]hould Congress, in the execution of its 
powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; 
or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its 
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted 
to the government; it would become the painful duty of this 
tribunal . . . to say that such an act was not the law of the land.”31 
Cohens v. Virginia provides an even starker example. Chief 
Justice Marshall, establishing the authority of the Supreme Court 
to review and reverse state court judgments on matters of federal 
 
 29. The anti-federalists warned that judges who are “independent of the people, of 
the legislature, and of every power under heaven,” will “soon feel themselves independent 
of heaven itself.” Brutus XV, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438 (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1981). 
 30. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 410 n.+ (1792) (reprinting the letter of the Circuit 
Court for the District Pennsylvania to President Washington). 
 31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819). Critics of the McCulloch 
decision, who were convinced that the Marshall Court would not strike down federal laws 
in circumstances where they impinged upon states’ rights (as the National Bank was 
alleged to do), mocked this passage—but they did so because “[t]he latitude of their 
construction [in McCulloch] will render it unnecessary for them to discharge a duty so 
‘painful’ to their feelings,” i.e., because they were skeptical that the Marshall Court would 
in fact take on the “painful” (to them) duty of constraining federal power. A Virginian’s 
“Amphictyon” Essays (1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH 
V. MARYLAND 75 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). See Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St. 
George Tucker and the Limited Construction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1343, 1377–78 (2006), for discussion. 
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constitutional law, wrote: 
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure 
because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We 
cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, 
with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must 
decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp 
that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason 
to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would 
gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to 
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our 
duty. In doing this, on the present occasion, we find this 
tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising 
under the constitution and laws of the United States.32 
Once again, the claimed authority to assert jurisdiction over 
state courts—an assertion sure to rankle the state judiciaries and 
states’ rights enthusiasts more generally—was cast as a painful 
decision, something the Court did not relish but rather was 
compelled to take on due to the mandates of law and the 
Constitution. A decade later, Joseph Story generalized the notion. 
The judicial branch, he wrote, is burdened by “the constant 
necessity of scrutinizing the acts of [the other branches] . . . and 
the painful duty of pronouncing judgment, that these acts are a 
departure from the law or constitution. . . .”33 Even today, 
commentators draw on Cohens and Justice Story to speak of “the 
Article III judge’s duty, upon pain of ‘treason to the Constitution,’ 
to apply the whole supreme law, no matter how ‘painful,’ 
‘difficult,’ or ‘doubtful’ doing so might be.”34 
The capacity of pain as a means of validating judicial practice 
continues to play a powerful role in discourse by and about the 
judiciary. In Mitchell v. Roberts, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered a statute which retroactively extended the statute of 
limitation for child sex abuse claims that had lapsed as of 2016.35 
The Court concluded that the statute violated the original 
 
 32. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). 
 33. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 542, at 391 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 2008). 
 34. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity 
and Quality of Decision-Making Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 
861 (1998). 
 35. 2020 UT 24 (2020); see Utah Code § 78B-2-308(7), invalidated by Mitchell v. 
Roberts, 2020 UT 24 (Utah 2020). 
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meaning of the Utah Constitution, notwithstanding the “heart-
wrenching” facts of the case and the Utah legislature’s 
“reasonable policy basis” that those abused as children may take 
decades “to pull their lives back together and find the strength to 
face what happened to them” and require a reprieve from normal 
statute of limitations rules.36 But, the Court continued, “our oath 
is to support, obey, and defend the constitution,” and judges are 
bound to enforce the rules of the constitution “whether or not we 
endorse its dictates as a policy matter.”37 Writing on this decision, 
Josh Blackman favorably commented that “A good gut check for 
originalism”—and, we might add, any theory of constitutional 
interpretation—“is whether a decision leads to results you 
disagree with. Here, the Utah Supreme Court passed that gut 
check.”38 
Perhaps the most prominent articulation of pain as a 
legitimator of judicial decision-making emerged in the 
confirmation hearings for then-Judge Neil Gorsuch’s nomination 
to the United States Supreme Court. Critics had seized upon one 
of Judge Gorsuch’s dissents, in the so-called “frozen trucker” 
case, in an attempt to demonstrate his inflexibility and/or extreme 
deference to employer power.39 The facts of the case are stark: the 
plaintiff, a commercial truck driver for TransAm, experienced 
catastrophic brake failure on his trailer while driving in sub-zero 
temperatures. He was instructed by his employer to remain with 
the trailer and await assistance. Unfortunately, his truck’s heating 
unit also failed and—after three hours of waiting in vain for a 
promised repair vehicle, during which his feet and torso went 
numb—the driver unhitched the trailer and attempted to drive to 
safety. He was then fired by his employer for abandoning his 
vehicle.40 
The locus of the case was whether or not the trucker’s 
decision to abandon his trailer constituted “refus[ing] to operate 
a vehicle” due to “a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to 
 
 36. 2020 UT 24, at ¶¶ 6, 52. 
 37. Id. at ¶¶ 51–52. 
 38. Josh Blackman, Originalism in the State Courts: Justice Tom Lee of the Utah 
Supreme Court on the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Volokh Conspiracy 
(June 18, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/06/18/originalism-in-the-state-courts-justice-tom-
lee-of-the-utah-supreme-court-on-the-due-process-clause-of-the-utah-constitution/. 
 39. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 40. Id. at 1208–09 (introducing the factual background of this case). 
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the employee or the public because of the vehicle’s hazardous 
safety or security condition.”41 The court majority (alongside the 
OSHA administrative law judge and the OSHA’s administrative 
review board) concluded that it was.42 Judge Gorsuch dissented, 
contending that the trucker had not refused to operate a vehicle 
but “chose instead to operate his vehicle in a manner he thought 
wise but his employer did not.”43 
In his dissent, Judge Gorsuch did express sympathy for the 
driver, describing his employer’s ultimatum as “legal if 
unpleasant” and conceding that “[i]t might be fair to ask whether 
TransAm’s decision was a wise or kind one.”44 “But,” he 
continued, “it’s not our job to answer questions like that. Our only 
task is to decide whether the decision was an illegal one.”45 
Challenged by Senators Al Franken and Mazie Hirono during his 
confirmation hearing, Judge Gorsuch said twice of the trucker 
that “my heart goes out to him,” and (to Senator Hirono) 
continued by saying that “I said that in the opinion that he was 
put in a rotten position. And I go home at night with cases where 
sometimes the law requires results that I personally would not 
prefer.”46 Consequently, Gorsuch’s backers sought to present his 
“frozen trucker” decision as modeling the sort of judicial behavior 
that should be rewarded via elevation to the Supreme Court, 
precisely because it conflicted with Gorsuch’s (and everyone 
else’s) moral intuitions.47 Senator Thom Tillis suggested that “my 
guess is when you rode home that night, you wished that” the 
statutory text would justify an alternate conclusion. But, he went 
on to say, “[y]ou are not here to have a heart. You are here to 
interpret and apply the law.”48 
 
 41. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B). 
 42. TransAm, 833 F.3d at 1214. 
 43. Id. at 1216 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 1215 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 171, 222 (2017) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]. 
 47. John Murdock, Why the “Frozen Trucker” Case Makes Me Like Judge Gorsuch 
More, STREAM (Mar. 24, 2017), https://stream.org/frozen-trucker-case-makes-like-judge-
gorsuch/ (“I would prefer to have on the Supreme Court [a judge] who is willing to endure 
a frustrating but legally correct result over someone who takes it upon himself to right 
every wrong according his own moral compass. Neil Gorsuch appears to be just such a 
disciplined justice.”). 
 48. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 46, at 235. 
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B. PAIN AS CONSTITUTING LEGITIMATE JUDGING 
In the above cases, the fact that a judicial decision is painful 
is taken to confirm that the decision is legally legitimate—indeed, 
its legal legitimacy is if anything more unimpeachable precisely 
because it is painful. To be clear, I do not indict any of the judges 
or commenters listed above for their observation that a painful, 
seemingly unjust decision may nonetheless be the legally correct 
one. Judges, after all, are not supposed to simply dispense justice, 
even in circumstances where there is widespread agreement 
regarding what “justice” would entail.49 To the contrary, as 
Herbert Wechsler observes, “[i]t is the duty [of the judge] to 
decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the 
law.”50 If, contra my reading of Judge Kopf above,51 there is to be 
a good yet happy judge, it is the judge who finds contentment in 
not deciding cases based on straightforward applications of their 
own interest and pleasure.52 On this note, the Supreme Court has 
been emphatic, and correctly so, in insisting that “courts do not 
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of 
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. . . . We refuse to 
sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation’ . . . .”53 
Some of the time, hopefully a large portion of the time, deciding 
in accordance with law will also yield just outcomes. But 
sometimes it will not—and that mismatch is baked into the 
foundation of legitimate judicial practice. 
Yet it is precisely because this truth is a truth that we 
encounter a risk. The logic above at most suggests that painful 
decisions are a signal, a heuristic, for legitimate, lawful judging—
they do not constitute lawful judging. But bereft of other modes of 
validation, this can easily be confused. Where pain is the primary 
 
 49. See generally Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 
VA. L. REV. 111 (1996) (discussing lessons learned from Learned Hand’s story about 
telling Justice Holmes to “do justice”). 
 50. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1959). 
 51. See supra text surrounding note 2. 
 52. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 634 (2000) (comparing the practice of judging 
with playing chess). 
 53. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963); see also Confirmation Hearing, 
supra note 46, at 274 (“[I]t is my [Gorsuch’s] job to respect in part the boundaries of [the 
judicial] branch, and not engage in the temptation to legislate through the cloak of a 
judicial robe.”). 
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mechanism through which we can conclude with confidence that 
a judicial decision is legitimate, the socialization of judicial 
legitimation becomes those instances where judges dispense and 
feel pain. This is the practice of sadomasochistic judging. 
The “pain” in these cases need not be and often is not literal 
physical injury. More often it comes in the form of deprivation of 
rights, intrusions upon liberty, and letting seemingly manifest 
injustices stand. The pain judges experience is typically not 
direct—they are not among those who are literally hurt by the 
decisions they hand down. In the most immediate sense, they are 
the inflictors, not the recipients, of pain (as Justice Thomas 
recently quipped—albeit again, likely somewhat in jest”—“I don’t 
have a lot of stress . . . I cause stress.”54). But judges nonetheless 
feel pained by the fact that they often are the inflictors of pain—
an act they do not intrinsically enjoy.55 What judges do enjoy is 
the elusive feeling of judicial legitimation. And judges thus 
eventually learn to take pleasure in this pain (of inflicting pain), 
because the pain itself signals that they are doing their job 
correctly—following the law, not allowing themselves to be 
guided simply by their own preferences. 
In the realm of sadomasochistic judging, judges (1) take 
pleasure from (2) the pain of (3) inflicting pain. This circuitous 
route is peculiarly modern in nature. As Nietzsche observed, 
modernity eliminated, or at least greatly reduced, the ability to 
enjoy cruelty in an unmediated fashion—as in the prince whose 
wedding entertainment includes a brutal execution or two.56 The 
 
 54. Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Clarence Thomas Perplexed by Retirement 
Rumors, BLOOMBERG L. (June 3, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week
/clarence-thomas-perplexed-by-retirement-rumors. 
 55. See Cover, supra note 2, at 1613 (noting that “for most of us, evolutionary, 
psychological, cultural and moral considerations inhibit the infliction of pain on other 
people,” but because “legal interpretation is as a practice incomplete without violence—
because it depends upon the social practice of violence for its efficacy—it must be related 
in a strong way to the cues that operate to bypass or suppress the psycho-social mechanisms 
that usually inhibit people’s actions causing pain and death”). 
Surgeons and other medical professionals face considerable distress due to their 
profession’s constant requirement that they inflict pain, even if that pain is in ultimate 
service of healing. “One surgeon who participated in discussions about the suffering of the 
healer identified this threat as a major reason many surgeons retire early. They cannot go 
on inflicting the pain and bodily damage that healing requires. . . . It is painful to inflict 
pain upon another.” John Rowe, The Suffering of the Healer, 38 NURSING F. 16, 18 (2003). 
 56. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF 
MORALS 198 (Francis Golffing trans., 1956). 
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modern pleasure in cruelty comes more indirectly—it is a step 
removed—and emerges instead from one’s willing self-
subjugation to the horrors one inflicts. Forbidden from enjoying 
the act of killing itself, the executioner instead takes pride in their 
commitment to their duty when carrying out an act as dreadful as 
an execution.57 
Stephen D. Smith contends that judges are rendered “mute” 
when faced with a manifestly unjust (or ridiculous) law that they 
believe is nonetheless constitutional. They can protest, as in 
Griswold, that it is an “uncommonly silly” (Justice Stewart) or 
“nutty” (Judge Bork) law, but this utterance is not at all legal—it 
is a “personal protest which, on the plane of legal discourse, 
lacked significance.”58 What this misses is how the act of protest—
indeed, the genuine emotive sensation that the decision needs to 
be protested—is actually doing something quite important as a 
means of validating the legal judgment. 
For judges, pain—unto others, unto self—offers a particular 
form of relief from the anxiety of judicial delegitimization, and 
thus is pursued as an analgesic. Whereas nominally the link 
between judicial legitimacy and painful decisions is only one of 
compatibility—a painful or unjust decision isn’t necessarily a 
wrongful one—sadomasochistic judging encourages judges to 
actively value those decisions which cause pain. Unsurprisingly, 
this may make them susceptible to erring on the side of pain, 
preferring the painful outcome to the fair or the just, even in 
circumstances where the latter may well have the better of the 
purely legal argument.59 
To call this dynamic of judicial pain being converted into and 
constitutive of judicial pleasure sadomasochistic is not to call it 
sociopathic. The mechanics of the conversion are far more 
 
 57. See James Miller, Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty, 18 POL. 
THEORY 470, 475–76 (1990). 
 58. Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113, 125 
(1988). 
 59. Daniel Greenwood notes that a similar phenomenon seems to occur in the 
corporate world, where directors and managers instructed to ruthlessly prioritize 
“shareholder value” over all else may mistakenly believe that a given strategy prioritizes 
shareholder value precisely because it is ruthless, and likewise dismiss courses of action 
which redound to the benefit of, say, employees or the public as incompatible with their 
fiduciary duties even when they are in fact perfectly viable, profitable business models. 
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 773, 780–808 (2004). 
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complex than simply desiring pain for its own sake.60 To begin, it 
is a mistake to think that people (judges and otherwise) simply 
avoid pain. In many—albeit usual special—circumstances, pain 
can be and is affirmatively sought out, and can even bring about 
its own form of pleasure.61 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
Freud discusses patients who seem to desire the repeated replay 
of experiences they know will be painful for them: “[p]atients 
repeat all of these unwanted situations and painful emotions in 
the transference and revive them with the greatest ingenuity. 
They seek to bring about the interruption of the treatment while 
it is still incomplete; they contrive once more to feel themselves 
scorned, to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and 
treat them coldly.”62 “None of these things can have produced 
pleasure in the past, and it might be supposed that they would 
cause less unpleasure today if they emerged as memories or 
dreams instead of taking the form of fresh experiences. They are 
of course the activities of instincts intended to lead to satisfaction; 
but no lesson has been learnt from the old experience of these 
activities having led instead only to unpleasure. In spite of that, 
they are repeated, under pressure of a compulsion.”63 This leads 
to Freud’s resurrection of masochism as a genuine phenomenon 
 
 60. Discussing sexual sadomasochism, Patrick Hopkins distinguishes between a 
“simulation” versus a “replication”—akin to the difference between acting out a scene in 
a movie versus committing a “copycat” crime. Desiring the former need not be simply a 
poor substitute for the latter—for example, one can enjoy roller coasters for simulating the 
adrenaline rush and danger of plummeting to earth at great speeds, while not actually 
wanting to experience the “reality” of it. Patrick D. Hopkins, Rethinking Sadomasochism: 
Feminism, Interpretation, and Simulation, 9 HYPATIA 116, 125–26 (1994). 
That said, there are important dissimilarities between judicial sadomasochism and 
bedroom S&M. Sexual S&M is consensual—not just in an abstract, stipulated way, but 
often in a highly technical and layered way. “Safe words” allow the sub to regulate or even 
dictate the action; they are able to choose and even critique the performance of the 
“master” or dominator. Id. at 123–24. Note how these rationales do not extend to the 
judicial context, where the pain inflicted is quite real, not “simulated,” there are no safe 
words which can call a halt to the action, and “consent,” if it exists at all, comes from an 
extremely abstract and attenuated “consent of the governed.” 
 61. See Leo Bersani, Foucault, Freud, Fantasy, and Power, 2 GLQ 11, 20 (1995) 
(citing Geoff Mains, The Molecular Anatomy of Leather, in LEATHER FOLK: RADICAL 
SEX, PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND PRACTICE 37–43 (Mark Thompson ed., 1991)) (“The pain 
so-called masochists enjoy is actually pleasure. They have simply found ways to transform 
stimuli generally associated with the production of pain into stimuli that set off intense 
processes identified as pleasurable.”). 
 62. SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 43 (James Strachey 
trans., 1959). 
 63. Id. at 43–44. 
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and eventually to his famous “death instinct”—a desire to move 
back towards simplicity and the relief of tension (death being the 
ultimate “simple” state).64 
Pain thus offers relief from a different, less tolerable source 
of pain. “Pain and suffering are sought, but only to avoid, evade, 
control, or master even more serious suffering or painful 
traumata.”65 For a Supreme Court Justice, the more serious 
trauma would be the sense of acting tyrannically or unlawfully, 
the anxiety around the Justice’s seemingly limitless freedom to 
simply “count to five.” The painful decision offers relief in the 
sense that it supposedly can confirm for the judge that this 
decision, at least, was not the product of their own whim and 
caprice—they can be confident in its lawfulness precisely because 
they abhor it as a matter of politics or ethics. 
Yet even under the paradigm of sadomasochistic judging, 
pain can only legitimize under a particular frame where the judge 
is assumed to be pained by the pain—it is not what they desire, it 
is what they are compelled to do as against their underlying 
desire.66 Pure sadism won’t do the trick. If it is believed (perhaps 
notwithstanding their own protestations) that judges actually do 
want to hurt racial minorities, women, gays and lesbians, 
transgender individuals, the poor, and so on, then their acts 
inflicting pain will not legitimize but delegitimize—this is just a 
(particularly vicious) iteration of the dangers of “counting to 
five.”67 It is only when judges are (perceived to be) themselves 
wounded that their infliction of pain legitimizes their action. 
Judges thus come to desire real pain, the pain they desire is pain 
that is recognized by all—including themselves—as pain. 
 
 64. Id. at 48–50; see also SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
103–11 (Joan Riviere trans., 1958). 
 65. Harold P. Blum, Sadomasochism in the Psychoanalytic Process, Within and 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle: Discussion, 39 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 431, 434 
(1991). 
 66. Cf. Gary F. Greif, Freedom of Choice and the Tyranny of Desire, 27 J. VALUE 
INQUIRY 187, 193 (1993) (noting that we sometimes “desire that some of our desires 
dominate us. We desire this so strongly as to be dominated by the desire to be dominated. 
I desire to be unable to satisfy a desire to kill someone who inflames my anger. I desire, in 
other words, to control those desires which I judge capable of leading me beyond civilized 
into barbaric behavior.”). 
 67. And it is worth noting here that it is a common tactic of abusers—those who are 
truly sadistic—to nonetheless claim that they are only acting, regrettably, under 
compulsion: “Why are you making me do this to you?” or “I hate that I have to do this.” 
SCHRAUB 35:3 12/29/2020 11:21 PM 
2020] BOOK REVIEWS 459 
 
Moreover, simple policy disagreement isn’t enough to render 
a judicial decision painful.68 As Fallon notes, judges frequently 
and with little consternation uphold, say, tax policy even if they 
personally feel that taxes are too high or too low. Judges “know 
they lack constitutional grounds to reject most if not all of the laws 
that they disagree with” (p. 94). Hence, more is required to 
harness the legitimating quality of a painful decision—it must be 
viscerally hurtful in some way, triggering intense feelings that the 
prevailing outcome is not just wrong in an abstract, technical, or 
debatable sense, but wrong on a deeper, more fundamental 
ethical register. 
Fallon does suggest a limit on this logic. He thinks that a truly 
disastrous judicial decision—one that “would plunge millions into 
poverty or the economy into chaos, or [would] upset settled social 
and political expectations with no plausible basis in the 
Constitution’s text or history for doing so”—“almost surely would 
not stick” (p. 116). Perhaps this is true—but notice even Fallon 
relies upon a crutch: “no plausible basis in the Constitution’s text 
or history.”69 One can hardly claim credit for making a particular 
ruling where there was no plausible basis as a matter of legal 
interpretation for deciding otherwise. But ironically, the painful 
route may thus be more attractive and more legitimizing if there 
is a plausible legal pathway to avoid inflicting the pain. In cases 
where there is a “plausible legal basis” pointing in either 
direction, the painful consequences of the court’s decision may be 
thought to further legitimate it as a question of law, and declining 
to succumb to the plausible legal “out” is even more 
demonstrative of the judge’s commitment to following the law 
wherever it leads. Even if we agree with Fallon and admit that the 
fully cataclysmic decisions likely will be avoided by all judges 
(“legitimated” by pain or not), that still leaves a wide range of 
cases that are not quite so apocalyptic but still could register 
significant painful injustices—and in that arena judges may find 
the pleasures of pain more difficult to resist. 
 
 68. This tracks distinctions we draw in non-judicial policy disputes as well—not every 
political controversy is “painful” in the sense that the prospect of the wrong side prevailing 
is felt as an outright injustice or cruelty. 
 69. Later in the same paragraph, Fallon draws the same connection: “The Court,” he 
concedes “can make, and has made, highly unpopular decisions. But it has not so far 
created havoc or issued rulings that lack any plausible constitutional foundation” (p. 116, 
emphasis added). 
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Ironically, given the attention paid to the “frozen trucker” 
case, a different Judge Gorsuch dissent while on the 10th Circuit 
aptly encapsulates both horns of the sadomasochistic judging 
dilemma. In A.M. v. Holmes, Judge Gorsuch dissented from a 
ruling giving qualified immunity to a police officer who arrested a 
middle schooler for fake burps in gym class.70 In Gorsuch’s view, 
it was clear that the relevant statute could not encompass mere 
“noises or diversions,” and so the officer should have been on 
notice that the arrest was unlawful.71 But Judge Gorsuch did not 
accuse the majority of being indifferent to the seeming injustice 
foisted upon a thirteen-year-old student whose childish prank was 
met with a criminal charge. To the contrary, he wrote that 
a judge who likes every result he reaches is very likely a bad 
judge, reaching for results he prefers rather than those the law 
compels. So it is I admire my colleagues today, for no doubt 
they reach a result they dislike but believe the law demands—
and in that I see the best of our profession and much to admire. 
It’s only that, in this particular case, I don’t believe the law 
happens to be quite as much of a ass as they do.72 
Here we see the difficulty of sadomasochistic judging at its 
fullest. On the one hand, there is the stated admiration of his 
colleagues for taking the painful route, reaching “a result they 
dislike but believe the law demands.” On the other hand, there is 
the undertone that in their zeal to be so admirably bound by the 
law, the judges in the majority ended up reaching a result that 
actually defied the relevant legal rules. The pursuit of pain as a 
marker of legal legitimation can, if not carefully attended to, lead 
to judicial decisions that are neither lawful nor just. 
III. OUR SADOMASOCHISTIC JUDICIARY 
And so we are back to where we started from, but in reverse. 
Judges, terrified of doing whatever they will, desire nothing more 
than that their rulings be thought to stem from naught but the 
law—a desire that is most obviously effectuated through pain. 
This desire becomes the new driver of the judicial will, and soon 
judges are actively pursuing and praising the infliction of pain—
 
 70. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 71. Id. at 1169 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Silva, 525 P.2d 903, 907 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1974)). 
 72. Id. at 1170. 
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all the more so in cases where the pain is unnecessary, where it is 
not clearly compelled by the law. The very rhetoric of the judiciary 
as bound and constrained by law becomes an impetus for judges 
to seek out the opportunity to inflict pain for its own sake. 
This is the grim era of sadomasochistic judging. Is it our era? 
There are worrisome signs. The Supreme Court, and its backers 
in the legal profession, have in the Trump era seemed to perceive 
the excesses of the administration as if anything counseling greater 
deference to the political branches enacting the cruelties. 
Shielding President Trump and Trumpists from legal 
accountability becomes itself the hill upon which the banner of 
legal responsibility must be planted—not in spite of but because 
of the genuine revulsion at the administration’s policies. 
Defending the constitutionality of the “Muslim Ban,” Josh 
Blackman insisted that “I vigorously oppose the president’s 
immigration orders as a matter of policy.”73 But, he continued, he 
also objected to courts seeking “to peer into the president’s 
psyche” in order to ascertain if he was motivated by invidious 
intent. The acknowledged wrongfulness of President Trump’s 
policy seemed to motivate an especially strong need to defend him 
against overzealous judicial checks. “[I]t doesn’t matter if Trump 
is somehow different than his predecessors, or if he insults judges 
in a shocking breach of Oval Office decorum. The judiciary 
should not abandon its traditional role simply because the 
president has abandoned his.”74 Jeffrey Toobin expressed a 
similar worry: relying on statements by the President which 
seemed to show he was motivated by anti-Muslim animus “leads 
to a peculiar and unsettling possibility: that an identical order 
would be upheld if Barack Obama had issued it, but that this one 
was invalidated because Trump was the author.” Toobin 
concluded that while Trump represents an “extreme example” of 
a politician who make “foolish statements or outright mistakes,” 
courts should “reject the use of Presidential statements 
altogether” when assessing the legality of presidential actions. 
“The Muslim ban is either constitutional or it’s not—and Donald  
   
 
 73. Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn’t Try to Read Trump’s Mind, POLITICO 
MAG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-courts-
shouldnt-try-to-read-trumps-mind-214921. 
 74. Id. 
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Trump’s words on the campaign trail don’t settle that question 
one way or the other.”75 
There is something peculiar about this objection. After all, 
there’s actually not anything unusual about courts probing state 
of mind to establish evidence of discriminatory intent. Indeed, 
that’s built into the very foundations of our anti-discrimination 
law regime—much to the consternation of many liberal 
commentators who wish for more objective metrics centered 
around the tangible impact government policies have against 
vulnerable outgroups to replace a subjective quest for malign 
motives. Nonetheless, under current law, if an employer sends an 
email to her employee saying “you’re fired,” the relevant anti-
discrimination question is whether the employer was motivated 
by discriminatory animus. If the boss had repeatedly promised she 
was going to implement a “complete shutdown” on minority 
employment at her firm, that insight into her psyche would play a 
very significant role in any ensuing litigation. An employer who 
had written the same note to the same employee, but who had 
exhibited no such indicia of prejudicial bias, would fare 
considerably better. 
But the implicit worry here seems to be that judges are 
deriving special rules stemming from Trump’s especially 
outrageous conduct, jerry-rigged in order to correct his injustice.76 
The result of this logic is that judicial decisions which check 
seemingly abusive or shocking conduct by the Trump 
administration become more suspect, while those which affirm or 
step out of the way of them become testaments to the power of 
the rule of law. And it’s a short step from there to thinking that 
the rule of law requires heightened deference to Trump 
administration actions precisely because they seem, to many 
 
 75. Jeffrey Toobin, The Courts and President Trump’s Words, NEW YORKER (Mar. 
17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-courts-and-president-
trumps-words. 
 76. This was Justice Thomas’ position in Department of Commerce v. New York, 
concerning the addition of a citizenship question to the census: the inference by the district 
court and the Supreme Court majority that the purported justification for the addition—
enforcing the Voting Rights Act—was pretextual “was transparently based on the 
application of an administration-specific standard.” 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[A] judge predisposed to distrust the Secretary or the 
administration could arrange those facts on a corkboard and—with a jar of pins and a spool 
of string—create an eye-catching conspiracy web.”). 
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judges and legal elites, to be unnecessarily cruel, painful, or 
malicious. 
Trump v. Hawaii does not stand alone—indeed, it is not even 
the most obvious case. Stephen Vladeck has observed how the 
Supreme Court’s “shadow docket”—cases which seek emergency 
or extraordinary relief from the Supreme Court, outside the 
normal and orderly pathways of litigation—has exploded since 
President Trump took office.77 These cases stand out because they 
represent discretionary interventions in ongoing matters of 
litigation, in circumstances where the Supreme Court has 
historically kept a very light hand. But the Trump administration 
has been remarkably successful in, for example, securing stays of 
lower court injunctions pending litigation without even awaiting 
the conclusion of a trial, let alone the appellate process. 
Remarking on one such stay, nullifying (without substantive 
comment) an injunction against administration rules drastically 
restricting the right of refugees to apply for asylum in the United 
States unless they had previously applied for and been denied 
asylum in any country they had traveled through to reach 
America,78 Justice Sotomayor observed that “[u]nfortunately, it 
appears the Government has treated this exceptional mechanism 
[of a stay pending appeal] as a new normal. Historically, the 
Government has made this kind of request rarely; now it does so 
reflexively.”79 And the Supreme Court seems willing to play 
along. 
While not involving the Trump administration, Dunn v. Ray 
seems to also be part of this trend.80 In Dunn, the Supreme Court 
stepped in to vacate a stay imposed by the Eleventh Circuit on an 
Alabama execution of a Muslim inmate where the state wouldn’t 
allow an Islamic chaplain to be present. By a 5–4 vote, the 
Supreme Court concluded (again, without any substantive 
comment), that the execution could not be blocked because  
the inmate allegedly waited too long to seek relief—even though 
he had filed his case just five days after the prison warden denied 
 
 77. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019) (documenting the Supreme Court’s unprecedented 
willingness to entertain petitions for emergency or extraordinary relief from the Trump 
administration). 
 78. Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019). 
 79. Id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 80. 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019). 
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his request for a chaplain in his own faith tradition.81 
Dunn provoked a furious backlash when it came out, even 
among conservatives, in its seemingly gratuitous viciousness 
towards a religious minority callously denied spiritual comfort as 
he approached his execution.82 But what makes Dunn stand out—
and what cries out for an explanation—is why the Court elected 
to intervene in the case at all. Three points are especially salient 
here: 
1) The inmate, Ray, had secured a stay of execution in the Elev-
enth Circuit. Hence, the Supreme Court was not in a position 
where it was being asked to affirmatively step in and enjoin a 
potentially unlawful act by the state of Alabama. The path of 
least resistance—a decision to do nothing—would have been to 
leave the stay intact, and allow the appellate process to operate 
as normal. Instead, the Court made an affirmative decision to 
“short-circuit[] that ordinary process . . . with little briefing and 
no argument.”83 
2) The Court rested its decision to vacate the stay based on “the 
last-minute nature” of the application.84 But note that in doing 
so it was not enforcing a formal rule—for example, that the 
claim was time-barred. It was a matter of pure discretion—and 
one in which, as noted above, compelling evidence suggested 
that Ray had in fact filed his application in a prompt and 
timely fashion. 
3) The Supreme Court is not a court of general error correction. 
Even if the Eleventh Circuit was in error in granting the stay, 
 
 81. Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 82. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Execution Decision Animates Critics 
on the Left and Right, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2019, 4:08 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/supreme-courts-execution-
decision-animates-critics-on-the-left-and-right/2019/02/11/72da5ed8-2e3a-11e9-813a-
0ab2f17e305b_story.html; David French, The Supreme Court Upholds a Grave Violation 
of the First Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 8, 2019, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-supreme-court-upholds-a-grave-violation-of-
the-first-amendment/; Dahlia Lithwick, An Execution Without an Imam, SLATE (Feb. 8, 
2019, 2:56 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/domineque-ray-alabama-
execution-imam-first-amendment-scotus.html; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dunn v. Ray: We 
Should Have Seen This Coming, ACS EXPERT F. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org
/expertforum/dunn-v-ray-we-should-have-seen-this-coming/. 
 83. Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 661 (quoting Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 
654, (1992) (per curiam)). 
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that alone does not compel the Court to review the case (or 
even make it particularly likely that the Court would do so). 
The question still remains: why was this error deserving of the 
Court’s limited time and attention? 
Is the answer latent anti-Muslim animus? Perhaps, and 
unfortunately in the wake of Trump v. Hawaii that possibility is 
less fanciful than one might hope. Another hypothesis, though, is 
that the justices recognized and were in some ways repelled by the 
decision to deprive a condemned man of spiritual comfort in his 
last days—but viewed that revulsion as corrupting proper 
“legalistic” judgment. They perceived the Eleventh Circuit as 
having indulged due to the extraordinary facts of the case, and felt 
it especially important to guard and check against that instinct. 
The justices may indeed feel pain at the pain they inflict, but they 
will take solace in the fact that it is in the service of their judicial 
duty. 
To be sure, sadomasochistic instincts do not win out in every 
case. The litigation surrounding President Trump’s decision to 
rescind DACA, for example, looked as if it might provoke a 
similar sort of decision—a conservative majority yielding to the 
power of the executive while exhibiting manifest discomfort with 
the policy outcome. In course of the DACA litigation, several 
prominent conservative voices interceding in favor of unraveling 
the limited protections DACA provides to undocumented 
immigrant children, even as they publicly (and I believe 
genuinely) declare their deep sympathy with the program’s 
beneficiaries. Blackman, along with Ilya Shapiro, even went so far 
as to file a brief under the unconventional but telling title 
“Supporting DACA as a Matter of Policy but Petitioners [seeking 
to rescind DACA] as a Matter of Law.”85 And after oral 
 
 85. Brief for the CATO Institute and Professor Jeremy Rabkin as Amici Curiae 
Supporting DACA as a Matter of Policy but Petitioners as a Matter of Law, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-587/113553/20190826102722898_DHS 
%20v.%20Regents%20Amicus%20Brief%20-%20Final.pdf. 
This brief also demonstrates that the dynamic I am identifying is not reducible to 
simple deference to democratic branches. While technically the posture of this brief was in 
support of the executive’s authority to “unwind” DACA, the authors make clear that they 
also believe (along with the Trump administration) that the DACA program is 
substantively unlawful and should be struck down by the judiciary, notwithstanding their 
political belief that it is just and wise policy. See id. at 3–4. 
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arguments concluded, many observers predicted that this posture 
would be reflected in the majority opinion: court-watchers 
believed that the conservative justices were poised to allow 
DACA to be unwound even as they expressed sympathy for the 
immigrant children who would be victimized by their decision.86 
When the case was decided however, Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the majority finding the DACA rescission unlawful, and a 
5–4 decision against the immigrants became a 5-4 decision in their 
favor.87 But one can still hear the themes of sadomasochistic 
judging reverberating in the language of the dissents. Justice 
Kavanaugh used sympathetic language to describe the “millions 
of young immigrants who, as children, were brought to the United 
States and have lived here ever since,” even as he concluded that 
the Trump administration had adequately explained its decision 
to strip them of DACA’s protection. The young immigrants, he 
wrote at the outset of his opinion, “live, go to school, and work 
here with uncertainty about their futures.”88 Justice Thomas for 
his part was even more blunt: describing the majority opinion as 
“an effort to avoid a politically controversial but legally correct 
decision.” “Such timidity,” he continued, “forsakes the Court’s 
duty to apply the law according to neutral principles.”89 That the 
Court’s decision gave a reprieve to an undeniably sympathetic 
class of individuals is, under this view, a glaring sign that the Court 
has been derelict in its constitutional duty. 
Lower court judges, too, have begun to wear accusations of 
injustice as a badge of honor. Such was the case in Jones v. Florida, 
where a divided Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the 
Florida legislature’s requirement that convicted felons pay any 
outstanding fines, fees, or restitution requirements before having 
their voting rights restored—even if the state itself could not 
reliably determine what those fees were.90 Judge Jordan, at the 
 
 86. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appears Ready to Let Trump End DACA 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/supreme-
court-dreamers.html (discussing the Justices’ opinions on ending the DACA program). 
Justice Gorsuch, for example, said of the pro-DACA litigants: “I hear a lot of facts, 
sympathetic facts, that you’ve put out there, and they speak to all of us.” Id. 
 87. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
 88. Id. at 1932 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 89. Id. 1919 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 90. Jones v. Florida, No. 20-12003, 2020 WL 5493770 (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2020). 
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end of a ninety-two-page dissent, compared the majority opinion 
unfavorably to the performance of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
predecessor during the civil rights era, when they had insisted on 
protecting the constitutional voting rights of unpopular minorities 
in the face of sustained and often violent popular opposition. He 
concluded that this opinion, by contrast, would not “be viewed as 
kindly by history.”91 
Chief Judge William Pryor, who wrote the majority opinion, 
took the unusual step of writing a separate concurrence to his own 
ruling solely to respond to this line. He explained to his dissenting 
colleagues that they needed to learn “a difficult truth about the 
nature of the judicial role.”92 A judge’s duty, he lectured, “is not 
to reach the outcomes we think will please whoever comes to sit 
on the court of human history.”93 Rather, it consists of “devotion 
to the rule of law and basic morality”—no more and no less.94 
The “and basic morality” clause of that passage is an 
exception that arguably swallows the rule of the argument. But 
we’ll leave that aside.95 What’s most striking about Chief Judge 
Pryor’s concurrence is the presumption that, by citing to the 
proverbial “court of history,” his dissenting colleagues were 
tacitly abandoning the terrain of legal obligation. But why should 
this be true? Judge Jordan’s dissent, after all, was perfectly 
legalistic in character—if anything, it was distinguished by its 
markedly textualist orientation, and indeed he expressly criticizes 
members of the majority for abandoning textualist methodology 
when “they do not like the result.”96 Those legal failings—
especially when in service to a grim cause like voter suppression—
surely could be ones judged harshly by history’s gaze. But Chief 
 
 91. Id. at *68 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at *21 (W. Pryor, C.J., concurring). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (quoting Patrick E. Higginbotham, Conceptual Rigor: A Cabin for the 
Rhetoric of Heroism, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1981)). 
 95. I will only say here that one of the most well-established features of the internal 
morality of law is that legal requirements must be made public, in language intelligible to 
those purportedly bound by them. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38 
(1969). The fact that Florida cannot even tell prospective voters what sums they are obliged 
to pay before registering—but is perfectly willing to re-incarcerate those who guess 
wrong—arguably fails even this extraordinarily thin moral requirement. See Jones, 2020 
WL 5493770, at *57 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (expressing incredulity at the idea that “a state 
can impose a condition for the exercise of a right or privilege, and then refuse to explain 
to a person what the condition consists of or how to satisfy it”). 
 96. Id. at *64 (observing that “[i]f that is textualism, textualism is a mirage”). 
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Judge Pryor seemed to view the consonance between ethical and 
legal obligation as presumptively suspect; the fact of the former 
serves to discredit the latter.97 
Chief Judge Pryor does not, to be clear, attack the decisions 
of his predecessors combating Jim Crow. Indeed, he characterizes 
those judges as “heroic.”98 But one might ask on what basis does 
he believe this “heroic” assessment is justified? Surely, it is not 
solely that these judges obeyed the law—most judges, one hopes, 
do that most of the time, without any particular valor or 
distinction. Equally surely, it is not that they flouted the law in 
service of their own moral code—these decisions were not lawless. 
What was heroic about the judges who rallied against Jim Crow 
voting restrictions is that the judges followed the law, and 
corrected grotesque injustices, notwithstanding powerful forces 
which insisted they had no right to do either. 
Sadomasochistic judging turns this history on its head. It 
assumes that the only true instances of judicial bravery are cases 
where judges permit, experience, and facilitate pain in martyrdom 
to the rule of law. The easiest thing in the world for a judge to do, 
under this theory, is to expedite justice—it is so easy that judges 
need to be conditioned to do the opposite. But this is simply not 
true. Judges confronted with the obvious legal infirmities of the 
Jim Crow regime could nonetheless have easily hid behind the 
judiciary’s constrained role as mere administrators of “the rule of 
law in courts of limited jurisdiction,”99 or the need to “respect the 
political decisions made by the people of Florida and their 
officials.”100 Many urged them to do just that; many harshly 
indicted them as lawless tyrants for not doing just that.101 The 
lesson of the struggle against Jim Crow in the courts is that, some 
of the time, correcting even evident wrongs that flout clear 
 
 97. Blackman, favorably quoting Chief Judge Pryor’s concurrence, stated that “when 
I hear the phrase ‘court of history’ or ‘arc of history,’ I simply presume that a liberal is 
trying to shame a conservative into reaching a liberal result. These phrases no longer have 
any meaning for me.” Josh Blackman, There Is No Court of History, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 12, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/09/12/there-is-no-court-of-history/. 
 98. See Jones, 2020 WL 5493770, at *21 (Pryor, C.J., concurring) (“Our dissenting 
colleagues predict that our decision will not be ‘viewed as kindly by history’ as the voting-
rights decisions of our heroic predecessors.”). 
 99. Id. (quoting Higginbotham, supra note 94, at 1343). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study 
of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 492–97 (2002). 
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constitutional commands is an act requiring great judicial 
courage. The lesson of the present moment is that some judges 
will fail to recognize these obvious legal violations not in spite, but 
because of the manifest injustices they accompany. 
CONCLUSION 
Speaking in defense of then-Judge Gorsuch’s rulings in the 
“frozen trucker” case and other like rulings, Senator Thom Tillis 
remarked that “[o]ne thing I like about you [Gorsuch] is 
sometimes your decisions seem to make everybody mad, which 
probably means it is a pretty good decision.”102 Like Justice 
Brennan’s quip about counting to five votes, it was no doubt 
meant somewhat tongue-in-cheek. But also like Justice Brennan’s 
statement, it gets to something important and somewhat 
disconcerting. It suggests that judges are trustworthy to the extent 
they make us mad, to the extent that they hurt us—and the more 
that they hurt us the more they should be trusted. 
The great philosopher, Judith Shklar, in her famous essay 
“Putting Cruelty First,”103 speaks of the deep troubles that lie in 
the seemingly liberal position that ranks cruelty as the single worst 
vice: it “makes political action difficult beyond endurance, may 
cloud our judgment, and may reduce us to a debilitating 
misanthropy and even to a resort to moral cruelty.”104 So to 
reiterate once more: any theory of legal legitimation that locates 
proper judicial interpretation in something other than a judge’s 
independent moral judgment has to leave open the possibility that 
a judge must, in adherence to the law, endorse a cruel decision. 
Judges cannot put cruelty first. But what they can choose to do, 
and may be at serious risk of doing, is elevate cruelty—precisely 
because it is cruel, and recognized as cruel and understood to be 
cruel—into its own form of ecstasy. The more one hates cruelty, 
the more one is convinced of one’s own righteousness for 
tolerating it. And then—the more cruelty one tolerates, the more 
confident one can be in one’s status as a legitimate judge. 
One way of resolving this dilemma is to find a knockdown 
theory of correct legal interpretation that can decisively inform us 
 
 102. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 46, at 235–36. 
 103. Judith N. Shklar, Putting Cruelty First, in ORDINARY VICES 7–44 (1984). 
 104. Id. at 43. 
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which decisions are lawful and which are not, and which can 
compel our obedience—damn the consequences. But, as Fallon 
compellingly demonstrates, we cannot have this and likely would 
not want it. And so here, finally, Fallon’s reflective equilibrium 
may well exercise a stabilizing influence. The problem of 
sadomasochistic judging assumes that the most serious threat to 
rule of law is the judge who flinches away from the cruel acts he 
or she must impose. Yet, as we’ve seen, this instinct, if carried too 
far, can generate a far graver risk—the judge who instead leans in 
to the cruelty, learns to seek it out and revel in it, precisely 
because they hate it. The reflective equilibrium mechanic does not 
abolish pain from judging. But it does offer a safety valve allowing 
judges to consider—legitimately consider—whether the pain they 
are dispensing is truly necessary to the service of the law. 
 
 
